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Abstract
Individuals infer their health risk from observing the health experiences of people
around them, particularly family members. I assess whether people correctly interpret
new information from these events and analyze resulting welfare implications. When
an individual is diagnosed with a new chronic condition, unaffected family members
increase their healthcare spending by over 10 percent. Informational spillovers are as-
sociated with increased use of both high- and low-return care, including takeup of new
services and increased adherence to extant ones. I show these responses are consistent
with individual reevaluations of health risk and reject other mechanisms. To assess
welfare implications, I estimate a structural model of health choices in which individ-
uals learn about risk after health events reveal information. I find that consumers
over-respond to recent, salient health events by over-weighting their risks ex-post. This
over-responsiveness leads to annual welfare losses of $2,788 per family on average;
suppressing responsiveness results in net gains for 86 percent of households. Reveal-
ing health risk information can be optimally targeted on household demographics to
improve social welfare gains.
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1 Introduction
Social networks provide important information for consumers making health care choices.
Through connections with family, friends, and neighbors, individuals form expectations of
their own health risks, learn about the value of specific medical practices, and identify how
or from whom to receive care. Family relationships provide particularly influential sources
of health information due to their close proximity and the high relevance of their health
experiences, as both shared genetic profiles and lifestyle choices influence expected health
care consumption. Understanding how individual health experiences shape family health
behaviors is essential for policies aiming to improve public health, such as those attempting
to address high levels of health care spending or the takeup of high-value health services.
One especially salient dimension of health information individuals may learn from family
health experiences is knowledge about health risks, including both current and expected
future health care needs. Individuals may choose to seek out high-value, life-saving care
after witnessing a family member’s health experience, particularly if that experience reveals
their own risk. For instance, some may choose to become vaccinated against COVID–19
once a family member becomes infected (Chen, 2021; Giardinelli, 2021; Salcedo, 2021).
There exists evidence that family members react to the health events of their loved ones
(Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019; Hodor, 2021), but it remains unclear what information drives
these reactions. Health events may lead individuals to reassess their specific health risks,
but individuals may also respond to other features of an event. These include changes to
the expected price of medical care, preferences for health consumption, or knowledge about
the availability of health services. Understanding the role that social connections play in
both the utilization of high-return medical care and the propagation of low-value services
relies on separating these competing effects. In particular, assessing the welfare effects
of transmitting new health information requires both understanding whether individuals
respond to information itself and the extent to which they update their beliefs correctly.
In this paper, I examine how consumers who receive health risk signals through witness-
ing a major health event within their household—such as a diagnosis with a new chronic
condition—modify their assessments of their own risks and alter their choices accordingly. I
study households with employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) obtained through large employ-
ers between 2006 and 2018. Highly-detailed claims data provides insight into how individuals
respond to quasi-random health events in their family, including overall responses in plan
choices and health spending as well as decisions about the use of specific services. Addition-
ally, these data include rich variation in coverage generosity and plan characteristics among
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enrollees, an important fact I leverage to separate changes in household beliefs about risk
from other, potentially confounding, effects of health events.
I show that major health events generate strong informational spillovers among non-
diagnosed household members. Those exposed to new health information significantly and
persistently increase both their overall health care utilization and their investments in pre-
ventive care, particularly for services that are specific to the condition just diagnosed in their
household. I show that these spillover effects are more consistent with individual learning
than other potential mechanisms. The magnitude of these increases is constant across in-
surance plan designs—including plans without deductibles—suggesting that moral hazard
concerns are not driving changes.1 Additionally, chronic events induce stronger and more
persistent behavior changes than acute health events, suggesting that salience effects arising
from a traumatic health experience do not fully explain observed results (Dalton et al., 2020;
Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019). Finally, I show that even individuals who are most familiar with
the health care system—such as those taking regular preventive medications for cardiovas-
cular health—are responsive to major health events, implying that learning about health
systems, rather than health risk, is not the main driver of observed results.2
In general, one would expect receiving new information about one’s risk to lead to im-
provements in decision-making and welfare. Surprisingly, however, I demonstrate that the
welfare effects of new information are not obvious from reduced-form analysis alone. Af-
fected household members increase their use of “low-value” health services, procedures that
are generally agreed to be cost ineffective due either to their reach (e.g., benefiting few pa-
tients) or their average returns (e.g., low levels of benefits relative to costs) (Colla et al.,
2015). Households responding to chronic diagnoses are most likely to increase their utiliza-
tion of low-value services that appear, from their perspective, closely related to preventive
care, including cardiac screenings before low-risk surgeries or imaging services for lower back
pain. In addition, households do not alter their insurance plan choices even after large ex-
pected increases in health costs from managing chronic conditions. Both of these findings
cast doubt on the extent to which health information improves choice quality.
These findings motivate a structural approach to model the evolution of household deci-
sions following health events and quantify the associated welfare effects of receiving health
information. I write and estimate a model in which households form beliefs about their health
risks over time. In my model, households first make decisions about their insurance coverage
1As is common in the health economics literature, I use the phrase “moral hazard” to denote induced-
demand effects arising from changes in the price an individual faces for care. For a more in-depth discussion
of this abuse of notation, see Einav et al. (2013).
2This general learning may include systematic learning about health care organizations, the process of
receiving insurance coverage for care, or building physician relationships (Sabety, 2020).
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prior to receiving information about their health state in a period; once this information is
realized, households choose health spending (Cardon and Hendel, 2001; Einav et al., 2013;
Marone and Sabety, 2021). Novel to my model, health shocks take two forms: major health
events and non-chronic health fluctuations. Major health events occurring in a household
induce other members to update beliefs about their health risks, but also affect consumer
choices by potentially lowering the conditional cost of non-chronic care and increasing risk
aversion. A structural approach allows me to separately identify these competing effects,
yielding clear estimation of the welfare effects from receiving health information.
A key challenge in my model is identifying changes in an individual’s beliefs about their
health risks separate from these alternative explanations. I use multiple sources of variation
in the data to decompose the effects of household health events. First, I use a broad set of
health events which vary in their expected treatment costs to identify the effects of price
changes on spending decisions. More expensive conditions (e.g., cancers) are associated with
stronger price effects than cheaper ones (e.g., asthma) and therefore are expected to induce
stronger moral hazard responses. Second, I exploit variation in the availability and generosity
of plans offered to households to separately identify changes in household risk aversion at
the time of plan choice. Here, the intuition is that individual beliefs about health determine
optimal medical spending and coverage levels, while household risk aversion also determines
the gradient of preferred coverage as the price or generosity of plans vary (Ericson et al.,
2020). I complement this approach with additional information about the circumstances
of a diagnosis (e.g., whether a hospitalization occurred) to further model risk preferences
and risk beliefs separately. Finally, I use both acute and chronic health events to assess the
extent to which individuals learn more generally about the health care system, rather than
the causal effect of new information about health risks.
Counter to expected thought, the new information gained from health events is not
welfare-improving for many households. In fact, new health risk information lowers expected
household utility by an average of $2,788 per year. The central insight of the model is that
there is a tension between the seriousness of a major health event and the appropriate level
to which individuals should update their beliefs: new diagnoses in a household spur overly
large changes in an individual’s assessment of their health risks, resulting in average posterior
beliefs that are well above the average in-sample risk of diagnosis. Counterfactual simulations
suggest that bounding these changes in risk beliefs substantially increases consumer welfare:
86% of the households in my sample would find health information welfare-improving were
their responses mitigated. Finally, I demonstrate that the societal value of communicating
health information can be improved by selectively revealing it to specific groups, such as those
with higher ex-ante risk. This suggests that population health information campaigns—
3
including genetic testing programs and screening practices for important conditions such as
COVID-19—can benefit from targeting specific groups.
My analysis contributes to a burgeoning discussion on the spillover effects of health in-
formation within social networks, including for family members responding to acute health
events (Bouckaert et al., 2020; Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019; Hodor, 2021; Song, 2021) and
community members responding to community-level health information, including vaccine
compliance (Archibong and Annan, 2021) and infectious disease outbreaks (Agüero and
Beleche, 2017).3 I contribute to this discussion in three ways. First, I illustrate that in-
dividuals are even more responsive to chronic diagnoses within their family than to acute
events. My analysis therefore highlights a novel channel for informational spillovers in a new
population. Second, I explore the mechanisms behind these responses, showing that changes
to how individuals assess their health risks appear to drive observed spending changes. Fi-
nally, I provide evidence that while health events increase investments in high-value care,
they are also associated with large errors in risk assessments and the takeup of low-value
care, resulting in welfare losses for households on average.
I also contribute to a growing literature that incorporates learning and preferences in
structural models of health behavior (Barseghyan et al., 2018; Bundorf et al., 2021a). I
incorporate the findings of this literature into the first structural model addressing the value
of health information spillovers, and highlight the particular behaviors—such as information
misinterpretation—that dampen potential welfare gains. My model encompasses previous
work highlighting the role major health events play in inducing demand responses by chang-
ing spot prices for other care (Eichner, 1997; Kowalski, 2016). Additionally, I make use of
previous identification results to simultaneously estimate weighted probabilities and standard
risk aversion parameters in a nonlinear framework (Ericson et al., 2020).4
Related to this, I also contribute to a literature on non-Bayesian learning, which empha-
sizes the disproportionate weight put on recent, and particularly salient, events (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1973). This literature emphasizes the role of individual over- and under-
reactions to new signals, and how this affects the ultimate convergence of individual beliefs
(Epstein et al., 2010). Models that incorporate such ideas include Holt and Smith (2009),
who find in an experimental setting that individuals significantly overweight new evidence
(relative to typical Bayesian predictions) when it had a lower ex-ante probability of occur-
3A rich literature has highlighted how individuals respond to information about their own health risks,
including their own diagnosis. For an in-depth review of this literature, see Alalouf et al. (2019). Some
previous work has demonstrated that certain diagnoses can have dramatic impacts (Almond et al., 2010);
however, examinations of other diagnoses revealed a lack of noticeable responses (Dupas, 2011; Kim et al.,
2019).
4See Barseghyan et al. (2013) and their later review paper Barseghyan et al. (2018) for a more thorough
discussion of the literature estimating models of probability weighting in other settings in economics.
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ring. Other important models draw attention to biased beliefs in models of consumer choices,
including their role in rationalizing choices that would otherwise require unreasonably high
levels of risk aversion (Ortoleva, 2012; Paserman, 2008; Spinnewijn, 2015).
My model highlights that over- or under-reactions can be accommodated ex-ante in a
quasi-Bayesian framework by varying the timing of belief updating. In addition, I simul-
taneously estimate biased beliefs and risk preferences, providing a micro-foundation of how
individuals form beliefs in a setting of largely small-probability events. My model provides
additional insight into the development of subjective health beliefs; in particular, I provide
new evidence that explains why consumers may be better at predicting their relative risk
rather than their absolute risk (Bundorf et al., 2021b), and how biases in assessing their own
health risks may arise (Arni et al., 2021).
Finally, my work is relevant to the well-established literature exploring suboptimal health
decisions made by most consumers (Abaluck and Gruber, 2011, 2016a; Abaluck and Com-
piani, 2020; Baicker et al., 2015; Handel, 2013; Handel and Kolstad, 2015; Iizuka et al., 2021;
Ketcham et al., 2012). This literature includes an ongoing discussion about the extent to
which improving health information generally may improve decision-making (Abaluck and
Gruber, 2016b; Cutler and Zeckhauser, 2004; Gruber et al., 2020). My analysis reveals that
some health signals—such as major health events—do little to align household choices with
the value of medical care, and may instead lead to an increase in the over-utilization of
services that provide little or no benefit to households. Hence, simply improving access to
health information may shift consumers only from one type of poor decision-making to an-
other, while increasing total health spending. Additionally, my paper underscores the role
of behavioral economics in structural models assessing the quality of consumer choices. I
show that including factors such as belief discounting may help to explain why overcoming
information frictions is not simply a matter of increased access to health information.
I present my empirical setting and data in Section 2. Following a discussion of major
health events, I provide evidence of their spillover effects and the potential mechanisms driv-
ing them in Section 3. Then, to evaluate the welfare effects associated with these responses,
I present the details of my model in Section 4 and its results in Section 5. The model out-
put informs several counterfactual analyses assessing the role of consumer responsiveness to
information, which I present in Section 6. Finally, I discuss the relevance of my findings and
directions for future work in Section 7.
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2 Empirical Setting & Data
My primary data on household plan choice, health utilization, and major medical events come
from the IBM/Truven Marketscan Commercial Claims and Encounters Data. These data
contain detailed inpatient, outpatient, and pharmaceutical claims for a sample of households
enrolled in ESI through large U.S. firms which contracted with participating payers. Each
observation includes diagnostic, procedural, and payment information, as well as household,
firm, and insurance plan identifiers. I obtained data from 2006 to 2018, with the exception
of plan identifiers, which are only available until 2013. Throughout, spending data has been
normalized to 2020 USD using the Consumer Price Index for All Urban Consumers series.
My final sample includes households with two or more members observed for two or
more years and insured with one of eight large firms. I required that each household have
full eligibility and continuous enrollment across their window of observation. My final sample
consists of 353,403 households and 5,439,482 individual-year observations.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the full sample as well as the subset of the sample
with insurance plan identifiers. It is important to ensure that the two samples are relatively
balanced given that I use only the plan-identified sample in my structural estimation (Section
4). In general, the two groups have similar demographics, spending trends, and health
states. A notable exception is that households in the plan-identified sample incur lower
out-of-pocket (OOP) costs than the full sample, suggesting that they possess more generous
insurance coverage on average. However, this is likely due to time trends arising from the
fact that the plan-identified sample runs only through 2013. Medical spending, as expected,
is highly skewed, with average annual household spending in the range of $2,500 compared
to a median of about $400. Observed switches in plan choices are low, consistent with prior
work (Handel, 2013).
2.1 Major medical events
I model the ways households respond to information about their health risk communicated
through major health events within the family. I identify these events based on observed
diagnostic codes in the claims data, using a subset of the Department of Health and Human
Services’ Hierarchical Condition Categories (HCCs). These HCCs, which are typically used
in risk adjustment models, identify a basic set of chronic illnesses that may alter overall
health utilization and spending. I limit my classification of health events to non-pregnancy
HCCs that occur with high frequency as discussed in Appendix A.2.
To ensure that I identify new diagnoses, I require that relevant diagnosis codes appear
during or after an individual’s second observed year. Additionally, I drop households for
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Table 1. Household Summary Statistics
Full Sample Plan-Identified Sample
Panel A: Household demographics
Family size 3.0 (0.00) 3.0 (0.00)
Employee age 45.0 (0.01) 44.4 (0.01)
Enrollee age 30.9 (0.01) 30.4 (0.01)
% female employees 41.6 (0.00) 42.4 (0.00)
% female enrollees 50.2 (0.00) 50.3 (0.00)
Panel B: Medical spending & plan choices
Total medical spending $2,504.41 [$679.75] (4.51) $2,454.88 [$624.16] (7.12)
OOP medical spending $443.07 [$109.66] (0.53) $337.98 [$80.33] (0.89)
% individuals w/ zero spending 15.4 (0.00) 16.6 (0.00)
% individuals w/ zero OOP 21.0 (0.00) 22.2 (0.00)
% switching plans – 5.3 (0.00)
Panel C: Major medical events
% experiencing chronic diagnosis 6.3 (0.00) 5.2 (0.00)
% experiencing acute event 1.0 (0.00) 0.6 (0.00)
Diagnosis OOP, chronic $1,082.05 [$464.69] (11.59) $854.62 [$329.90] (17.72)
Diagnosis OOP, acute $2,494.42 [$1,419.91] (68.05) $2,107.09 [$964.62] (122.50)




Notes: Values based on Marketscan claims data, 2006–2018. Enrollees are employees plus their covered
dependents. Spending values are reported in 2020 USD. Standard errors are reported in parentheses
and sample medians (when reported) are in brackets.
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which the diagnosed individual is not present for at least a full year after their medical event
to exclude individuals who might have passed away during or shortly after their event.
An important feature of my analysis is the separate treatment of health costs for major
medical events, including the costs associated with maintaining the health of someone with
a chronic condition. To measure these costs, I collaborated with Rebecca Hughes, MD, to
identify a set of disease-specific procedures and prescriptions associated with each health
condition in my sample.5 I then identify household spending on these health events based on
the claims for these procedures and prescriptions, both in the year of diagnosis and following
years. As reported in Table 1, the average (median) household in my sample spends $683.60
($446.69) out-of-pocket on recurring costs needed to care for chronic conditions.
2.2 Plan characteristics.
Heterogeneity in each household’s choice of plans provides a plausibly exogenous source of
variation in how major medical events and chronic health costs impact household spend-
ing decisions. I exploit the claims data to estimate the characteristics of each plan in my
households’ choice sets, which will be important inputs in my theoretical model.
I define a household’s plan choice set at the firm-state-year level, and limit attention to
plans covering at least five percent of all covered lives within a firm-year to rule out executive
plans.6 In reality, health plans are defined by a complicated set of cost-sharing measures,
including copayment and coinsurance rates that vary widely across provider specializations,
networks, and procedures. For tractability, my structural model takes in a simplified ver-
sion of these measures: a family deductible, a simplified non-specialist coinsurance rate, and
a family OOP maximum. I construct measures for each plan’s individual and family de-
ductibles based on the empirical distribution of payments in the claims data (Zhang et al.,
2018). I then estimate the other two cost-sharing parameters as those that minimize the sum
of squared residuals between predicted and observed OOP spending for households within
each plan year (Marone and Sabety, 2021). Appendix A.1 describes this methodology in
more detail and evaluates the quality of these inferences. I find that these simplified mea-
sures capture a wide degree of variation in my data and harmonize well with measures from
earlier work. Finally, I estimate each plan-year’s family premium as the average cost of all
households enrolled in the plan over a year, and assume that employee premium contribu-
5Appendix A.3 lists the relevant codes used for each diagnosis.
6My data does not distinguish whether there exist plan “tiers” within firms (for example, a university
that offers one set of plans to its faculty and a different set to its graduate students). These unobserved
barriers may cause measurement error in the plan choice sets used in the structural model in Section 4;
however, such error would not affect any of my primary results, which focus on how new health information
alters spending choices conditional on the choice of plan.
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tions are consistent with the national averages for household coverage (on average about
28% of the household premium; KFF (2020)).
There is substantial variation across firms, regions, and years in the generosity of coverage
offered to employees, which I describe in Table 2. As I describe in Section 4.3.2, such variation
provides an intuitively useful means of attributing household behaviors to changes in risk
preferences versus risk beliefs ; households who are more risk averse tend to minimize their
overall variation in ex-ante expenditures by choosing more generous health plans, while
households who are less risk averse but believe they are at higher risk for major health
events may choose less-generous plans overall that instead provide more targeted coverage.
The average household has between two and four plans to choose from in a given year, with a
wide degree of variation in the average family deductible. This variation is comprised of both
heterogeneity in the frequency with which firms offer zero-deductible health plans as well
as in the size of nonzero deductibles. Similar variations exist in other plan characteristics,
including copayment rates and OOP maxima.
Table 2. Average Plan Characteristics, 2006–2013
Firm
A B C D E F G H
# of plans offered 3.5 2.5 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.6 2.8 3.0
Spending/Enrollee ($000s) 12.7 9.8 9.7 10.2 9.3 8.9 9.1 11.5
Family deductible ($000s) 0.4 0.4 2.1 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.5
% of 0-deductible plans 64.3 46.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2 31.8 38.9
Family OOP max. ($000s) 3.5 4.6 5.1 5.9 4.3 4.1 5.2 3.9
HHI of all plans 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.7 0.4
Notes: Averages are pooled across all plans and years in a given firm.
3 Spillover Effects of Household Health Events
This section presents my main reduced-form empirical results. I first show that after expe-
riencing a chronic major health event, households increase their overall medical utilization
by about 10% annually, as well as increasing their investment in billed spending on pre-
ventive care. I illustrate that the observed responses are consistent with a reevaluation of
one’s own risk by showing that households are more likely to invest in preventive care that is
specific to the illness their family member experienced. I then consider other potential mech-
anisms, including financial incentives, salience effects, and general learning about the health
care system. Finally, I show that household members increase their utilization of “pseudo-
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preventive” low-value services—such as extraneous screenings and imaging services—showing
that while health events generate strong spending responses, these responses are not neces-
sarily targeted at high-return services.
3.1 Induced Spending Changes
To estimate the causal impact of health shocks on health choices, I first estimate two-way
fixed effects (TWFE) “event study” regressions of the following form:
sinh−1(yft) = αf + τt +
T∑
k=−T
γk1 {t− Eft = k}+ εft. (1)
The variable yft represents a spending outcome for a household f in year t; in my main
specification, this outcome is annual OOP payments made by all family members except
those who experience the major health event. I adjust for highly-skewed distributions of
spending variables by using the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.7 An added advan-
tage of this transformation is that the resulting regression coefficients can be interpreted as
approximate percentage changes in the outcome variable, relative to the year prior to the
shock. I include household and year fixed effects, as well as dummy variables indicating when
an observation occurred relative to Eft, a household’s event year. The coefficients on these
indicator variables, {γk}, are the objects of interest. I also adjust for potentially correlated
responses within a household by clustering standard errors at the household level.
This approach allows me to identify the potentially time-varying effects of health shocks—
which might have decaying influence on household choices over time—while simultaneously
controlling for any unobserved household- or year-specific deviations in behavior. How-
ever, recent work has highlighted that TWFE estimators can be difficult to interpret with-
out strong modeling assumptions (Callaway and Sant’Anna, 2018). In particular, coef-
ficients estimated by TWFE models represent the weighted average of many two-by-two
comparisons. When treatment effects are heterogeneous across groups—and hence, these
comparisons—some comparisons may be assigned negative weights (de Chaisemartin and
D’Haultfoeuille, 2019; Goodman-Bacon, 2018). This makes the interpretation of estimated
treatment effects—static or dynamic—difficult to interpret. Furthermore, when estimating
dynamic treatment effects, researchers must take care that dynamic parameters of interest
7I use the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to accommodate the approximately 15% of individual-
years in my data with 0 spending (Harris and Stöcker, 1998). Bellemare and Wichman (2020) show that for a
model with continuous variables x and y and specification sinh−1(y) = βx+ε, the elasticity of y with respect
to x is (βx/y)
√
y2 + 1 ≈ βx whenever y ≥ 2. Bellemare and Wichman (2020) also discuss the ways using
this measure may refine estimates using the more common log(y+ 1) transformation. I show in Appendix B
that my results are not substantively altered when using the logarithm transformation.
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(including both pre-trends and estimated time-varying treatment effects) are separately iden-
tified from time fixed-effects included in the regression (Borusyak and Jaravel, 2016; Sun and
Abraham, 2020). Without including a control group of observations which are never treated,
separate identification of time fixed effects and dynamic treatment effects is impossible.
I demonstrate that my analysis is robust to both concerns. First, I show that my coeffi-
cients of interest do not suffer from problems of negative weighting by considering a number
of additional specifications in Appendix B. These include both robust estimators proposed
by de Chaisemartin and D’Haultfoeuille (2019) and Sant’Anna and Zhao (2020), as well as
simple recentered time series graphs and standard difference-in-differences coefficients.8 This
provides evidence that my results are not idiosyncratic to my estimation method; rather, my
results appear even in the raw data.
Second, I utilize a large control group in my sample, allowing me to separately identify
the time-varying treatment effects from yearly fixed effects. Previous work examining health
spillovers within families has restricted the control group to only those who experience a
similar diagnosis in the future in order to utilize a control group that more closely matches
the treatment group on unobservable characteristics. I include never-treated households in
my sample in order to identify dynamic treatment effects. The central tradeoff in doing so lies
in the validity of the parallel trends assumption: namely, that in the absence of major health
events, the treated and control groups would continue to have similar spending and utilization
trajectories. Given that my setting spans a large range of chronic conditions—many of which
are neither directly related to health behaviors or particularly life-threatening—concerns
about violations of the parallel trends assumption are less plausible in my setting.
Figure 1 presents the time-varying causal effect of a health shock on household OOP
spending for all non-diagnosed individuals. The first panel illustrates that non-diagnosed
household members increase their annual OOP spending by about 10% relative to the year
prior to the event. For the median (average) household, this corresponds to an increase of
about $50 ($115) annually. This effect begins in the year of the health event and persists
following the diagnosis. Additional results in Appendix B corroborate this finding with other
outcome variables including total billed spending or visit frequencies.
Importantly, this increase in utilization encompasses an increased investment in preven-
tive care. The second panel of Figure 1 illustrates this by limiting the scope of the analysis
to household spending only on wellness visits. Wellness visits are non-problem-based visits
with a family or primary care physician that are generally recommended about once a year;
8Using the Bacon decomposition reveals that the estimands in my primary specification are not con-
structed using negative weights (Goodman-Bacon et al., 2019). However, I present these additional robust-
ness results for completeness.
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Figure 1. Effect of Chronic Diagnoses on Non-Diagnosed Household Members’ Spending
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Notes: These figures show estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of a new
chronic diagnosis on medical spending. In both panels, the sample includes spending for all household
members without major health events. In panel (a), the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic
sine of total OOP spending; panel (b) estimates the effect on total spending (insurer spending + OOP
spending) on wellness visits only. Coefficients are presented relative to the year prior to diagnosis.
Spending is measured in 2020 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
these visits include routine screenings for important chronic conditions including cancers
and mental health conditions. These visits constitute an important jumping-off point for
the use of other preventive services (Jiang et al., 2018) and are therefore generally consid-
ered to be an important form of high-value care (Tong et al., 2021). Here, too, I find that
new diagnoses in a household are associated with strong responses. Affected, non-diagnosed
household members increase their overall spending on wellness visits by about 10%, matching
the increase in overall utilization.9
3.2 Changes as Responses to New Health Risk Information
These results suggest a meaningful, persistent change in how non-diagnosed household mem-
bers engage with the health care system. I first show that these responses are indicative of
household members updating their beliefs about their own health risks following the receipt
9Even before the Affordable Care Act (ACA)’s cost-sharing exclusion took effect in 2010 (or 2012 for
certain women’s health services), OOP costs for preventive care were steadily declining for those with ESI
(Hong et al., 2017). Once the ACA took effect, the majority of wellness visits should be free to enrollees in
my sample (Shafer et al., 2021), a feature I observe in the data. Although time fixed effects in the regression
specification should absorb these trends for both pre- and post-ACA trends, I use billed spending rather
than OOP spending as my outcome variable of interest. Note that in my data set, billed spending represents
the sum of individual OOP payments and insurer payments to the provider; it does not reflect any price
negotiations or other discounts that were provided at the time of service, and therefore does not reflect the
listed prices of services.
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of health information from a major event. Such observed responses could also be driven by
factors beyond changes in a household’s assessment of their health risks, including changes
in the price of care, salience effects, overall exposure to the health care system, or improved
physician relationships. I explore these alternative mechanisms in Section 3.3.
To more explicitly explore the link between major health events and risk beliefs, I esti-
mate the causal effects of health shocks on preventive services that are specific to an affected
household’s diagnosis. Here, the intuition I rely on is that household exposure to risk infor-
mation is more targeted than other forms of health information; hence, the extent to which
I observe households selecting into preventive services that are disease-specific rather than
general provides evidence of responses specifically to new risk information.
Figure 2. Rate of Diabetes Screenings Around Time of Diagnoses
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Notes: Figure shows average utilization rates of diabetes screenings for non-diagnosed household mem-
bers 18 years of age and older, measured in rates per 1,000 adults. Point estimates and 95% confidence
intervals are presented. The top (solid maroon) line indicates average rates for households who experi-
ence a diabetes diagnosis, and the bottom (dashed navy) line indicates rates for those affected by other
chronic diagnoses. The horizontal, dotted green line indicates the average utilization rate for all other
households in the sample who do not experience a diagnosis, about 59 screenings per 1,000 adults.
For example, individuals who have learned that they are at increased risk for developing
diabetes may have a higher likelihood of seeking out screenings for abnormal blood glucose
levels than individuals who have learned that they are at increased risk for another chronic
condition. Figure 2 plots re-centered time series that depict the associations between house-
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hold diagnoses and the takeup of diabetes screenings for adults within a household. The
figure plots average utilization rates of diabetes screenings for two groups: those who are
exposed to a diabetes diagnosis in their home and those who are exposed to a different
chronic diagnosis. Individuals whose family members are diagnosed with conditions other
than diabetes do not appear to significantly alter their screening behaviors from unaffected
households (whose average is depicted in the horizontal, dotted green line). On the other
hand, household members of those diagnosed with diabetes increase screenings in the first
three years following the diagnosis, being about 36% more likely to be screened for diabetes
than unaffected individuals.
To assess the causal effect of multiple diagnoses simultaneously on the utilization of
disease-specific preventive care, I use a triple-differences approach. This approach disentan-
gles two competing effects: those arising from experiencing any chronic illness (e.g., salience
effects) and a disease-specific informational effect. I estimate the effect of a new chronic
diagnosis on a household f ’s decision to screen for a specific diagnosis d during time t, as
summarized in Equation 2:
Pr(Screening)fdt =βDD(postt × chronicf ) + βDDD(postt × chronicf × 1 {chronicf = d})
+ αf + τt + εfdt,
(2)
where chronicf is a dummy variable indicating whether any chronic diagnosis occurred
within the household and postt indicates periods following a diagnosis. The triple interac-
tion variable includes an additional constraint that the chronic diagnosis chronicf match
the specific diagnosis d (e.g., a diabetes diagnosis when the outcome variable is a diabetes
screening). Hence, βDD identifies the effect of any chronic diagnosis on screening, while the
triple interaction βDDD identifies the effect for the specific diagnosis of interest relative to
other diagnoses.10 For example, using this approach I can estimate the impact of a diabetes
diagnosis on diabetes screenings as βDD + βDDD, where βDD indicates the impact of experi-
encing any chronic diagnosis in the household on diabetes screenings and βDDD indicates the
specific differential effect of a new diabetes diagnosis occurring in the household.
The triple difference approach is advantageous because it allows me to compare the causal
effect of diagnoses on the use of preventive care across multiple control groups. When the
outcome variable of interest is a screening for a specific service (e.g., diabetes), this approach
estimates the effect of a corresponding diagnosis relative to all other diagnoses, for which the
10The sum of the coefficients βDD + βDDD identifies the diagnosis-specific effect of receiving a diagnosis,
relative to all non-diagnosed households in my sample. Notice that, in Equation 2, all requisite interaction
terms for the triple differences are either subsumed in the fixed-effects or colinear with the included variables
given the unique structure of my treatment variables.
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screening reveals no information. In this context, the identifying assumption for the triple
differences approach is the same as the identifying assumption for the simpler difference-
in-differences regressions: that spending differences between diagnosed and undiagnosed
households would have evolved similarly over time in the absence of treatment.11
I estimate several versions of this regression for various diagnosis-screening pairs. I select
diagnoses and screenings which are commonly utilized and for which there are clear diag-
nostic codes available. I examine the impact of new diabetes and cancer diagnoses on their
respective screenings, as well as the effect of diabetes diagnoses on cholesterol screenings.
I also assess the impact of any new chronic diagnosis in a household on the rate of new
hypertension diagnoses, relative to all major health events.12
Finally, to verify my results, I estimate this model for screenings for which health events
communicate little useful information, and hence are expected to change behavior little. This
might be because a diagnosis doesn’t require a doctor’s visit to diagnose (e.g., obesity) or
doesn’t require preventive screening prior to seeking treatment (e.g., mental health condi-
tions, such as major depressive disorder). Hence, observing a lack of response among these
types of preventive services serves to underscore the role that health information, specifi-
cally, plays in altering individual behavior. I include “placebo” regressions for the effect of
new diabetes diagnoses on obesity diagnoses and the effect of new mental health disorder
diagnoses on screenings for depression.
Table 3 presents the estimation results from these six regressions in two panels. First, I
highlight that new chronic diagnoses alter specific preventive behaviors in cases where they
transmit important information about health risk. The occurrence of any chronic diagnoses
in a household is associated with a 19.4% increase in the rate of hypertension diagnoses
among other affected household members. Furthermore, specific diagnoses such as cancer
and diabetes increase the likelihood that a non-diagnosed household member will seek out
screening by 13.2% and 21.1%, respectively. Finally, diabetes diagnoses are associated with
an increase in cholesterol screenings of 7.2%. Similar to previous work, I find evidence that
new diagnoses reduce the rate of other, unrelated screenings (Fadlon and Nielsen, 2019); for
example, a non-diabetes chronic diagnosis is associated with a 7.4% decline in the rate of
11When adding the triple interaction, the identifying assumption is modified only to include the assump-
tion that spending differences between households diagnosed with one condition and households diagnosed
with another would have evolved similarly in the absence of treatment, a statement which is subsumed in
the initial identifying assumption. Appendix B includes standard difference-in-differences regression results
that corroborate the findings reported here.
12Given that there is no procedure code for hypertension screenings, this approach proxies the effect of
the risk information associated with chronic diagnoses on new general wellness screenings, relative to the
other forms of health information accompanying acute events. Coding practices reduce my ability to test
this finding for each individual diagnosis in my sample; for example, there are no diagnostic or procedure
codes used exclusively for asthma screenings.
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diabetes screenings among non-diagnosed household members. These effects, however, are
typically smaller than the estimated increases in disease-specific screenings, suggesting that
this crowding out is not necessarily one-to-one.
The second panel of Table 3 reports results for placebo regressions including obesity
diagnoses and depression screenings. Here, I find no strong evidence that health events alter
screenings. This is consistent with the notion that individuals respond by altering their use
of preventive care only when the major health event communicates health risk information
that necessitates preventive care utilization. Other dimensions of a health event—such as
learning about the role of preventive care in medical maintenance overall—do not appear to
drive individual behavior changes, at least in the use of preventive services.
Table 3. Effect of Chronic Diagnoses on Take-Up of Disease-Specific Preventive Care
Own Screening Household Pre-Diagnosis Effect of Any Effect of Specified
(Dependent Variable) Diagnosis Average Diagnosis (βDD) Diagnosis (βDDD)
Panel A: Main Effects
Hypertension1 Any Chronic2 2.01 -0.27∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.102) (0.110)
Cancer Cancer 20.72 -0.01 2.74∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.113) (0.509)
Diabetes Diabetes 6.21 -0.46∗∗∗ 1.31∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.086) (0.279)
Cholesterol Diabetes 17.01 -0.22 1.23∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.126) (0.389)
Panel B: Placebo Regressions
Obesity1 Diabetes 1.04 0.02 0.10
(0.005) (0.035) (0.110)
Depression Depression 0.36 -0.01 -0.08
(0.003) (0.037) (0.077)
Notes: Table presents results from six triple-difference regressions highlighting the role of household
investments in disease-specific preventive care following adverse health events. Each regression uses
as its outcome variable a binary indicator for the screening listed in the first column, and a binary
indicator for the event in the second column as its treatment variable (see Equation 2 for the full
specification). Regression coefficients for the typical difference-in-difference effect (βDD) indicate the
effect of any chronic health event on screenings; the triple differences coefficients (βDDD) indicate the
effect of the specific diagnosis on screening choices. Robust standard errors clustered at the household
level shown in parentheses. 1 Due to unavailability/low-use of CPT-4 procedure codes for screenings,
these outcomes are measured as new ICD-9-CM/ICD-10-CM diagnosis codes. 2 Here, the reference
group is all acute major health events. ∗p < 0.05,∗∗ p < 0.01,∗∗∗ p < 0.001
I report additional results in Appendix B. I find that in addition to selecting screenings
based on the health risk information they receive, households are selective in which members
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they choose to screen. I utilize variation in intrafamilial relationships and corresponding risk
to show that households screen those who are most affected by the new health information.
When households are affected by a chronic illness with a strong genetic component, such as
type 1 diabetes, children and siblings of the affected individual are more likely to be screened
than other household members. On the other hand, diagnoses such as type 2 diabetes—which
has a stronger lifestyle component than a genetic one—are associated with more frequent
screenings for spouses. Taken together, the observed ways in which major health events
affect the use of preventive care are all consistent with a model where households interpret
new diagnoses as signals of their own health risk, altering their behaviors accordingly.
3.3 Alternative Explanations for Spending Changes
Although individuals appear highly responsive to new information about their own risk,
additional factors could separately cause or exacerbate observed changes in health spending,
including moral hazard effects, salience effects, and learning about the health care system.
In this section, I explore each of these potential competing explanations and show that they
are each insufficient to explain my observed results.
3.3.1 Moral Hazard
A natural response to observing the phenomenon illustrated in Figure 1 is to conclude that
the spending increase is driven by induced demand responses among the non-diagnosed in-
dividuals. A chronic diagnosis—such as diabetes— implies consistent, predictable costs on
a household—such as through insulin prescriptions and endocrinologist visits. These addi-
tional costs, which are largely fixed for the individual, shift the cost-sharing characteristics
of a health plan for the rest of the household, effectively lowering their spot price of fu-
ture (non-chronic) health care. These induced-demand responses have been studied within
families experiencing sudden acute health shocks that unexpectedly meet their household
deductible (Eichner, 1998; Kowalski, 2016).
Two features of the results suggest that these induced-demand responses are unlikely to
be the principal driver of the results. First, the costs of a chronic diagnosis are typically larger
in the year of diagnosis than in future years, especially when a hospitalization is required to
diagnose the illness or there are acute complications that must be dealt with. This would
suggest that if other household members were responding to changes in care prices alone,
their responses would be much larger closer to the diagnostic event, and more muted in
following years. Figure 1 does not show this to be true, either for overall utilization or the
use of wellness visits specifically. Second, Figure 3 illustrates that non-diagnosed individuals
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respond to health shocks even when those shocks do little to change their spot price of
medical care. Were moral hazard responses the principal mechanism of response, households
in these plans would have much weaker incentives to adjust their choices.13
Figure 3. Effect of Chronic Diagnoses on Spending: Households Facing Zero Deductible
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Notes: These figures show estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of a new
chronic diagnosis on medical spending. This figure uses a limited sample of only households enrolled
in health insurance plans with zero deductible at the time of the event. In both panels, the sample
includes spending for all household members without major health events. In panel (a), the dependent
variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total OOP spending; panel (b) estimates the effect on total
spending (insurer spending + OOP spending) on wellness visits only. Coefficients are presented relative
to the year prior to diagnosis. Spending is measured in 2020 USD. Standard errors are clustered at the
household level.
3.3.2 The Effect of Salience
It may also be that the intensity of major health events realigns household preferences to
prioritize medical care. Individuals who experience the hospitalization of a household mem-
ber may (over-)respond to the trauma of the event itself, changing their health consumption
behaviors in order to avoid future hospitalizations. The critical difference is that when in-
dividuals respond to this health trauma, health events alter an household’s risk preferences
by affecting their marginal utility of medical care, rather than affecting risk beliefs.
To examine the impacts of these salience effects relative to risk reassessments, I analyze
the responses of individuals who experience acute, rather than chronic, health events in their
households. These include hospitalizations for family members who experience severe viral
13A corresponding result for the subset plans with nonzero deductibles is included in Appendix B. Ad-
ditional results in this Appendix show that families who are closer to meeting their deductibles prior to a
health event are not more likely to increase their spending than those for whom chronic care costs may not
meaningfully change family cost-sharing rates.
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infections or other serious conditions unrelated to chronic disease. I use health events that
are still assigned HCCs to capture health events of a similar level of seriousness to new
chronic diagnoses; however, these events do not communicate any information to household
members about health risks. Comparing observed household responses to these acute events
against responses to chronic diagnoses allows me to assess the extent to which new health
risk information alters behavior beyond salience.
Figure 4. Effect of Acute Health Events on Non-Diagnosed Household Members’ Spending
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Notes: These figures show estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of a new
acute hospitalization on medical spending. The solid maroon line indicates estimates from an acute
event; the dashed navy line presents estimated results from Figure 1 as a reference. In both panels,
the sample includes spending for all household members without major health events. In panel (a),
the dependent variable is the inverse hyperbolic sine of total OOP spending; panel (b) estimates the
effect on total spending (insurer spending + OOP spending) on wellness visits only. Coefficients are
presented relative to the year prior to diagnosis. Spending is measured in 2020 USD. Standard errors
are clustered at the household level.
Figure 4 presents the results. I find that, unlike new chronic diagnoses, acute hospi-
talizations spur few changes in health behaviors among other household members. Acute
hospitalizations are associated with a short-term increase in spending of about five percent
(from a baseline of about $1,100) in the year of the diagnosis, but these effects do not persist
across time. Acute health events are also not associated with increased investments in pre-
ventive care for other household members. In particular, Figure 4 compares these regression
coefficients to those estimated in response to new chronic diagnoses (Figure 1). I find that
chronic health events are associated with overall spending responses almost twice as large
as for acute hospitalizations, differences which are significant at the 95% confidence level for
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the first three years following diagnosis. Furthermore, chronic diagnoses induce significantly
more investment in preventive services for the first five years following a diagnosis.
Given that acute hospitalizations make health care at least as salient—if not more so—
than chronic diagnoses, these findings suggest that changes in risk preferences arising from
a “health scare” are insufficient to entirely explain changes in behavior. Rather, new health
risk information, such as about one’s inherent genetic risk for a chronic condition, appear to
drive observed changes.
3.3.3 Health Information
New diagnoses may also alter spending patterns by providing families with more general
health information, such as information about the value of medical care, the process of ob-
taining covered care through an insurer, or how to establish strong provider relationships.
Generally, learning about health risks and this more systematic learning imply similar re-
sponses among affected individuals, making their effects difficult to disentangle.
I focus on a particular case where new diagnoses provide risk information without more
systematic information: non-diagnosed household members who were taking medications to
prevent cardiovascular disease prior to the diagnosis within their family. Cardiovascular
preventive drugs, including statins and other cholesterol-lowering drugs, are an extremely
common class of medications and are known to be effective in preventing future health
problems when used appropriately (O’Connor, 2006).14 In this analysis, I limit my sample
to those who have filled a prescription for these medications at least once per year during their
first two years in the sample. I then measure the effects of chronic diagnoses on utilization
and adherence among refills of these prescriptions.
This setting provides a unique environment in which to disentangle the effects of general
learning about health systems and learning about one’s own health risk. Individuals with
existing prescriptions already have sufficient knowledge about the health care system to
receive this care from their provider and insurer. Hence, while major health events provide
them with information about the potential value of adherence to their medication (along
with the potential consequences for not doing so), these events are unlikely to provide new
knowledge about how to obtain this medication.
I show, however, that new diagnoses alter adherence to these prescriptions. I estimate
the effect of a chronic diagnosis on both the likelihood of any medication use and overall
adherence, measured as the proportion of days covered in a year (Choudhry et al., 2009).
This measure is standard in the literature on adherence, and corresponds to the fraction
of the year after a patient’s first prescription fill for which the patient has a supply of
14Appendix Table A.5 contains a detailed list of the therapeutic classes used in my sample.
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Figure 5. Effect of Chronic Diagnoses On Adherence to Existing Preventive Medications
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Notes: These figures show estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for the effect of a new
diagnosis on adherence to preventive medications whose prescriptions were first written prior to the
major health event. The sample is limited to all non-diagnosed individuals who filled preventive car-
diovascular medications at least once per year during their first two years in the sample. In the first
panel, the dependent variables is a binary indicator for whether the prescription was refilled at all.
The second panel uses the proportion of days covered by any preventive cardiovascular medication as
the outcome variable (Choudhry et al., 2009). Coefficients are presented relative to the year prior to
diagnosis. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
the medication. One concern in identifying the effect of new diagnoses on adherence is
that prescription adherence may decay over time in response to barriers such as financial
concerns or apathy (Slejko et al., 2014). Importantly, this may occur at different rates for
different individuals both within and across households, meaning that these trends would
not be accounted for using only household and year fixed effects. I therefore add a variable
controlling for the number of years an individual has been in the sample to Equation 1.
Figure 5 presents the estimated dynamic treatment effect of a new chronic diagnosis on
adherence to existing preventive prescriptions. As expected, in the absence of new health
information, individuals become less adherent to prescriptions over time. However, diagnoses
in the household spur a resurgence in both the likelihood that individuals will fill their
prescriptions at all and the proportion of days covered: affected individuals are around ten
percentage points more likely to refill their prescription in the year of a major medical event
than in the year before, translating to an additional eight percentage point increase in the
average proportion of the year for which they are covered by the prescription. The fact
that new diagnoses change individual adherence to prescriptions even among a population
which has access to and knowledge of specific preventive care illustrates that individuals are
learning about more than just how to obtain care. The estimated causal “re-adherence” to
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prescriptions is consistent with individuals reevaluating the value of their medication given
new information about their health risks.15
3.4 Quality of Induced Spending Changes
Major health events generate strong spillover effects within a household on both overall uti-
lization patterns and preventive care investments. It is natural, therefore, to ask how these
responses are distributed within a larger framework of health spending. Do major health
events contribute to more informed decisions about the type of care consumers choose to
utilize? Or does the salience associated with health trauma lead to further over-utilization
of low-return services? I address these questions by examining household use of services typ-
ically deemed as “low-value” by medical professionals and health officials (Chua et al., 2016;
Colla et al., 2015).16 Low-value services include both services whose cost typically outweighs
any benefits to an average patient (e.g., unnecessary surgeries such as arthroscopies) as well
as services which are chronically over utilized in ways that dramatically lower their return
(e.g., imaging services such as MRI services for chronic migraines). Avoiding the use of these
services can result in an overall higher quality of health care through both cost reductions
and the avoidance of unnecessary risks.
I find that new chronic diagnoses are associated with an increase in overall low-value
spending of about 5 percent (Appendix B). However, these results mask significant hetero-
geneity across different types of low-value services. Low-value services may differ in their
perceived value to an affected household depending on the ways in which health events induce
behavior changes. For example, if a chronic diagnosis communicates new risk information to
a household, they may find low-value screening services—such as imaging services and pre-
operative visits—to be more attractive. On the other hand, households that respond to the
price effects induced by a major health event may be more likely to seek out high-cost, low-
return services such as elective surgeries. To explore these differences in-depth, I separate
my sample of low-value services into five categories: pediatric services, including imaging
services and the early use of medications such as antibiotics; adult prescription drugs, such
as the use of opiates to treat migraines; unnecessary imaging services for adults, including
for lower-back pain; extraneous screening services for adults, including cardiac testing before
low-risk surgeries; and adult surgical procedures, such as arthroscopy for knee pain.
15These effects are likewise observed in the sample of households with zero deductible, suggesting that
this re-adherence is also not exclusively driven by moral hazard responses.
16These health services are based on recommendations made with the Choosing Wisely initiative, directed
by the American Board of Internal Medicine Foundation and other physician specialty organizations (Bhatia
et al., 2015; Wolfson et al., 2014). Appendix A.5 contains more detail about the specific services included in
each measure.
22
Table 4. Estimated Effects of Chronic Illness on Low-Value Care Utilization
Population Pediatric Adult Services
Service Category All Services Prescriptions Imaging Screening Surgery
Postt× Diagnosisf 0.051* -0.004 0.029*** 0.103*** -0.096***
(0.017) (0.000) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Adjusted R2 0.192 0.143 0.123 0.163 0.230
Notes: Table shows estimated difference-in-difference regression coefficients for the effect
of a new chronic diagnosis (N=1,538,161). Outcome variables are the inverse hyperbolic
sine of billed spending in each category. See Appendix A for service definitions. Spending
is measured in 2020 USD. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in
parentheses.
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001.
Table 4 presents results estimating the effect of a new chronic diagnosis in each of the five
categories using a standard difference-in-differences framework (event study regressions are
included in Appendix B). New chronic diagnoses shift households spending and utilization
into low-value service categories comprised of screening services, pediatric care, and imaging
services. The effect sizes range from an increase as large as ten percent for low-value screen-
ings to three percent for imaging services.17 I find no effect on the misuse of prescription
drugs among adults.
These results suggest that households seek out care that they see as useful in prevent-
ing or identifying future illness, even if those services are generally understood by health
professionals as being low return. Although I observe households utilizing more of these
services—such as preoperative screenings or imaging services—it is unclear whether these
are decisions made at the household level or by a physician who knows the family history
and hence deems these services as appropriate. This provides new suggestive evidence that
the utilization of low-value care may be tied more to risk beliefs rather than ignorance about
the actual returns of a service. This is in keeping with recent work (Finkelstein et al., 2021).
In addition to the utilization of low-value care, I explore other ways health events alter
the quality of consumers’ health care decisions, including their plan choices (Appendix B).
In general, I do not find that major health events prompt households to switch their health
insurance plans. While new diagnoses in a household are associated with marked differences
in observed spending behavior, it is still unclear whether these choices are ex-post more
17The results also provide preliminary evidence that major health events provide a deterrent from low-
value elective surgeries. However, Appendix Table B.3 highlights the strong presence of pre-trends in these
models, which obfuscates the true causal effect of the diagnosis.
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optimal for affected households. This motivates a more structural approach to quantify the
welfare effects of health information.
4 Empirical Model of Belief Formation
In this section, I estimate the impact of health risk information on consumer choices as
well as its implied welfare effects in a structural model of health utilization. I build on a
canonical two-stage model of health spending (Cardon and Hendel, 2001). In the first stage,
households choose an insurance plan to maximize their ex-ante expected utility, based on
their available information about the distributions of future shocks. In the second stage,
individuals within the household choose their spending and utilization based on realized
health shocks and their chosen health plan’s features.
I extend the existing model in two important ways. First, I allow consumers’ types
to be adaptive in response to health experiences. In my model, individuals learn about
their probability of adverse health events; in addition, health events may alter household
risk aversion to capture potential salience effects. Second, I explicitly model the differences
between acute and chronic health shocks, as chronic health shocks impose recurring costs on
a family, thereby altering conditional OOP prices for non-chronic care and inducing moral
hazard effects within a household.
4.1 Model Primitives
Consider a household f comprised of individuals i ∈ If . Individuals belong to one of two
types—those without chronic illnesses and those with at least one chronic condition. I assume
state-dependent preferences, so that the utility of receiving medical care differs across these
types. Time is discrete and indexed by t; I am thus abstracting away from the timing of
health spending within a year. Households and individuals are characterized by three main
variables: individual beliefs about health risks (pift), household risk aversion (ψft), and the
distributions of their health shocks (discussed below). New health events—including both
new chronic diagnoses and acute hospitalizations—cause all household members to update
their beliefs about their health risks, as well as potentially altering household risk aversion
and OOP prices.
In each period, two types of shocks are realized. Following typical convention, each in-
dividual has an acute health realization λift drawn from an individual-specific distribution
Fλift(·). Acute health realizations model the uncertain aspect of demand for healthcare,
with individuals with higher λift being sicker and hence demanding greater healthcare con-
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sumption.18 Second, households in each period receive a chronic health shock, mCHft . This
shock represents the disruptions in health spending affecting the household that arise from
any new chronic diagnoses affecting an individual in the family; for households without a
new diagnosis, this amounts to the expected cost of a new diagnosis. For households with
pre-existing chronic conditions, these shocks are the health costs associated with maintaining
health for those affected by the conditions.19
4.2 Model Stages
Families make two choices during each period. First, families choose their insurance coverage;
then, acute and chronic health shocks are realized; finally, individuals choose their yearly
health spending. These choices are static, in the sense that both households choose plans
and individuals make spending decisions on the basis of the current period’s utility and type
parameters only (including their beliefs about health risks). The model is static, in the sense
that household decisions in period t do not affect outcomes in period t + 1. I can therefore
ignore forward-looking behavior.20 However, individual and household type parameters—
including beliefs and risk aversion—are responsive to exogenous shocks, including major
health events. These parameters adjust at the end of each model period, following individual
utilization choices. I model the evolutions of these parameters using a Bayesian framework.
In the following sections, I outline the stages of the model in reverse—that is, I first
present details of the individual spending choices in Section 4.2.1, followed by a discussion
of household plan choices in Section 4.2.2. I then discuss how type parameters respond to
exogenous health shocks in Section 4.2.3.
4.2.1 Utilization Choice
After choosing a health plan j ∈ J and realizing the vector of acute and chronic health shocks
(~λift,m
CH
ft ), each individual in the household chooses their medical spending on non-chronic
medical care, m∗ift. In this stage, individuals make decisions independently to maximize
their personal welfare; in the first (plan choice) stage, households make a collective decision.
18Rather than simply having families draw their health expenditure mi following a plan choice (Handel,
2013; Layton, 2017), I explicitly model these health shocks in order to separately identify how spending
choices are reflective of beliefs about major health events, as well as to estimate the effects financial distortions
caused by health events contribute to moral hazard in spending.
19Many related models incorporate heterogeneity in individual demand elasticities in order to accommo-
date heterogeneity in moral hazard effects (Einav et al., 2013; Marone and Sabety, 2021). As my model is
concerned with disentangling only moral hazard events induced by major health events, I restrict the demand
elasticity parameter ω in my model to be homogeneous across individuals and periods.
20Households are, however, forward-looking within a period, as they anticipate second-stage outcomes as
part of their first-stage choices. See equation 9.
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Given the flexibility in health states, which vary across individuals, households will ultimately
distribute health spending so that the least healthy members receive the most care, as would
be expected. Hence, this assumption makes the model more tractable without imposing
restrictions on household behavior.
As is typical for these models, individuals trade off health production and wealth. In
my extension of the model, individuals face residual uncertainty as to the likelihood of their
own major medical events, which they believe occur with probability pift.
21 Individuals then
choose mift in order to maximize their expected utility over states:
m∗ift ≡ argmaxmiftEU(mift; pift) = piftuift,C + (1− pift)uift,H, (3)
where uit,C and uit,H represent individual utilities when diagnosed with a chronic illness and
when not diagnosed, respectively. Note that Equation 3 nests the case where an individual
has already been diagnosed with a chronic illness, in which case pift = 1. I assume that each




ft ) = h1(mift;λift,m
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uift,C(mift;λift,m
CH
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ft ) + ε2. (5)
The returns to medical spending h1(·), h2(·), and g(·) are assumed to be concave, so that
within-year health fluctuations λift alter the optimal level of utilization m
∗
ift. Remaining
annual income is denoted by yift(mift;m
CH
ft ). ε1(·) and ε2(·) are preference shocks to capture
unobserved changes in preferences due to major medical events.
I parameterize these utility functions as quadratic loss functions in the difference between
medical spending and acute health status, in keeping with past work, but allow for a poten-
tially state-dependent utility function in which health status potentially alters the marginal




ft , j) = (mift − λift)−
1
2ω
(mift − λift)2 − cj(mift). (6)
21Although the value of chronic care costs are assumed to be made known to a household before they
choose their non-chronic spending, the model abstracts away from the specific timing of individual costs
within a year. Hence, even within a period, individuals have not learned whether they have a chronic illness,
and hence maximize an expected utility across both states of the world. It is not until the end of the period
that individuals know their true state and update their beliefs pift.
22Previous work discuss and provide evidence for state-dependence in the utility of non-medical consump-
tion (Finkelstein et al., 2013, 2009); this model introduces suggestive evidence for the state-dependence of
non-chronic medical consumption as well.
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Here, cj(mift) represents the OOP costs associated with spending mift, conditional on the
choice of plan j. Hence, individuals choose medical spending to approximately match their
acute health realization λift, accommodating the associated OOP costs of that spending.
On the other hand, individuals in the state of chronic illness face a utility function
that depends on both acute and chronic health shocks, with potentially differing preference
parameters. Their utility, which depends on the same model primitives as Equation 6, is
given by:







ft − λift)2 − cj(mift). (7)
In this state, utility is derived from both chronic and non-chronic medical spending, each of
which is potentially valued at a different rate than non-chronic medical spending for healthy
individuals as indicated by the parameters (α1, α2).
Solving the expected-utility maximization problem is straightforward; however, as the
marginal OOP cost changes based on where it is evaluated, the solution depends on which
“region” of OOP costs an individual finds themselves in conditional on their health shocks
(see Appendix C for details). If the realized acute health shock is negative (or sufficiently
small relative to the shift parameter), individuals will choose m∗ift = 0 as spending is required
to be non-negative; otherwise, optimal spending follows the condition:
m∗ift =
1
1 + pift(α1 − 1)
(
λift + ω(1 + pift(α1 − 1)− c′j(mift;mCHft ))− piftα2mCHft
)
. (8)
The interpretation of Equation 8 elucidates the key insights associated with this state-
dependent utility framework with separate chronic care costs. In this expansion of the model,
individuals choose to consume less non-chronic health care as chronic care costs increase in
value, either by increases in magnitude, marginal utility, or likelihood. As discussed in
Bleichrodt and Eeckhoudt (2006), the extent to which households mismeasure pift may
artificially alter optimal spending decisions based on both the level of actual risks and the
extent of the measurement error. Under the assumptions that households begin with pi0
close to zero, major health events could be associated with large (relative) increases in pift,
potentially explaining the dramatic and persistent shifts observed in Section 3.
Equation 8 also highlights the ways that chronic care costs affect spending decisions
through prices. The OOP cost function cj(mift;m
CH
ft ) is assumed to account for the price of
chronic care first in the timing of health spending, before any other non-chronic spending.
This anticipation of chronic care costs shifts the boundaries between optimal spending so-
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lutions by depressing the rate at which discretionary medical spending translates into OOP
costs. This is the method by which moral hazard effects arise from major health events.
4.2.2 Plan Choice
In the first stage of the model, households choose an insurance plan to maximize their ex-
ante expected utilities without knowing their realization of individual health shocks λift or
major health costs mCHft . This expected utility depends on the distributions of both health
shocks as well as a household risk aversion parameter, which depends flexibly on household
demographics and is allowed to evolve over time to capture the salience effects associated
with health events, as discussed in Section 4.3.1. The household expected utility function










where u∗ift represents the optimal payoff to individual i in period t given the realization
of acute and chronic health states.23 In addition to each individual’s realized OOP costs
for non-chronic medical spending, households face OOP costs for chronic care represented
by cj(m
CH
ft ). Households also face plan premiums πj and a perceived monetary cost η for
switching plans (1fj,t−1 is an indicator for whether the family chose plan j in year t− 1).24
4.2.3 Parameter Updating
After households and individuals have made their plan and spending choices, type parameters
evolve in response to health events. Of particular interest is the way that individuals update
their beliefs about their unknown transition probability (pift). Additionally, households
23One concern with a utilitarian index here is that households may have little incentive to diversify their
medical spending across household members. However, the choice of the utility function used in the second
(spending) stage of the model makes it optimal for families to allocate care according to each individual’s
realization of λift; hence, this modeling choice does not give rise to families allocating all of their care to a
single individual. An alternative approach is to use a CES function for utilities; however, this introduces more
nuisance parameters into the estimation framework. Finally, I assume that the von Neumann Morgenstern
(vNM) utility index for this decision possesses a constant coefficient of absolute risk aversion, a common
choice for these models as it implies no wealth effects.
24I do not observe premiums or contributions in my data and therefore follow the methodology of Layton
(2017). In particular, I assume that premiums are equal to the average cost among the employees with
dependents enrolled in the plan during the prior year plus a fixed overhead cost, and then assume that
employee contributions are 28% of that value (KFF, 2020). Note that as Layton discusses, identification
of the structural parameters in this model do not depend on accurate estimation of premiums, but rather
require that the premium differential across firms is correct.
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update their risk aversion parameters (ψft) according to an adaptive framework; I discuss
this further in Section 4.3.1.
I model individual learning about health risks as a Bayesian updating process in response
to health events. In particular, I assume that initial beliefs depend on individual demograph-
ics, including age, sex, health risk scores, and the presence of any pre-existing conditions
within the household. Prior beliefs are based on a signal xif0, which is assumed to be nor-
mally distributed with mean and variance parameters (µpi0, σ
2
pi0); this signal is mapped into
a probability pif0 ∈ [0, 1] using the standard logistic function. The center of the distribution
µpi0 varies with individual demographics and is potentially correlated with other household
type parameters.
Major health events provide individuals with signals yift about the underlying distribu-
tion of pift, I likewise assume that these signals are normally distributed, so that the mean
and variance of an individual’s posterior distribution has a closed-form solution in each pe-
riod. Specifically, if yift ∼ N (µ̃ift, σ̃2ift), the evolution of the mean and variance parameters

















where the variable sift indicates how many health signals an individual has received by the
end of period t.
An important potential difficulty when using a Bayesian framework with rare events
is the choice of updating frequency. Given the relative rarity with which chronic health
shocks occur, updating of probabilities after each period would result in posterior beliefs
that are tightly centered around the initial mean, varying little with new information. In
such a regime, individuals would have to perceive health shocks as being impossibly likely
(e.g., µ̃ift much greater than 1) in order for health shocks to meaningfully change health
beliefs. This is inconsistent with the analysis I have presented previously, which shows that
individuals are highly responsive to chronic health shocks.25
25In addition to the analysis presented here, I also find that older individuals have stronger responses to
chronic health events in their household than younger individuals, even after conditioning for risk score (not
shown). If individuals behaved as though they updated their health beliefs in each period—regardless of if a
signal or health event occurred—then older individuals would have belief distributions more tightly centered
around their mean, hence their posterior distributions following a realized health signal would shift less than
younger individuals with more flexible priors. I do not observe this to be the case.
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I address this inconsistency in my preferred specification by assuming that households
update their beliefs conditional on a health event occurring. This reduces the number of
uninformative signals individuals process, and hence avoids problems of weight degeneracy,
and is consistent with individuals who form beliefs about their health risk once, and then
only revisit those beliefs once they have been called into question. Once the individual begins
evaluating their health risk beliefs (e.g., after a diagnosis has occurred within the household),
they do so in a completely standard way, including updating beliefs in all following years
without major health events.
Such an approach is an intuitively appealing way to deal with the issue of Bayesian
updating when signals are infrequent. However, my results are robust to alternative specifi-
cations, including (i) an adaptive learning framework where individual beliefs are specified
as an AR(1) with some dependence ρ < 1 on the previous period’s beliefs, and (ii) a more
traditional setup where individuals update their beliefs with some probability p > 0 in
the absence of health events.26 Additional modeling possibilities include the use of quasi-
Bayesian modeling where individuals disregard less salient signals, but still update beliefs in
each period (Rabin, 2013), or where individuals over-weight “good news” relative to “bad
news” (Eil and Rao, 2011).
4.3 Estimation
4.3.1 Parametrization
The unit of observation is a family f comprised of a set of individuals If in year t. Each
family faces a choice of plans that varies at the firm-year-state level.27 Households are charac-
terized by their unobserved type variables {pift, λift, ψft}i∈If . I allow the initial parameters
(pif0, λift, ψf0) to be arbitrarily correlated, and link them to observable data by assuming























26For a more in-depth review of the relative strengths and weaknesses of Bayesian or adaptive learning
in structural modeling, see Aguirregabiria and Jeon (2020).
27I ignore plans that have less than five percent of the overall firm-year market share in my data to avoid
including executive health plans in employee choice sets.
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Covariates X include age, sex, health risk score, family size, and the presence of pre-existing
conditions in a household. In practice, I use individuals’ first year of data in Xp and Xλ
and within-individual averages in Xψ.
Individual beliefs evolve in response to signals about their health risks as discussed in
section 4.2.3. I assume that these signals yift are normally distributed with variance σ
2
π (to
be estimated) and a mean given by the logit regression:
yift = π11{chronic}f,−i + π21{acute}f,−i + π31{acute}f,i + π4xift, (13)
where chronic and acute indicate the occurrence of chronic or acute health events within a
household and xift is a variable for the number of years that have passed since the earliest
major health event in the family. Hence, π1 is the main parameter of interest, identifying the
effect of a household chronic diagnosis on individual beliefs. On the other hand, the variance
of the signals, σ2π, reveals the magnitude of unobserved information affecting individual health
risk probabilities.
To parameterize the distribution of acute health shocks, I assume that Fλ(·) is a shifted
lognormal distribution. This is a natural parameterization as the distribution of annual
health expenditures is highly skewed (Mitchell, 2020). The choice of shifting the distribution
accommodates the approximately 15% of individuals in my sample who choose zero medical
spending in a given year. I therefore model an individual’s (correct) beliefs about their
transient health shocks by
ln(λift − κif ) ∼ N (µλ,if , σ2λ,if ). (14)
When κif is sufficiently large (and negative), small and negative values of λift may lead to
zero spending being the utility-maximizing solution for an individual.28
Acute health shocks at the individual level are therefore summarized by three parameters:
(µλif , σ
2
λif , κif ). The parameter σ
2
λif reflects the precision in an individual’s beliefs about their
transient health state. Both σ2λif and κif are estimated as a linear projection on individual
covariates (see Appendix C).
In contrast, I directly use empirical distributions of chronic care costs from my data in
household expected utility. I assume that individuals have rational expectations over the
distributions of their chronic health care costs, which change when they experience major
28Previous work has allowed the distributions of these shocks to evolve over time. In my model, which
separates acute and chronic health shocks, such variation would amount to shifts in the need for non-chronic
health spending, such as variation in an individual’s anticipated office-visit spending from year to year. In
addition to being of second-order concern to my setting, such variation seems indistinguishable from the
random variation in the draws of λift already present.
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health events. This is a simplifying assumption employed for tractability, as my model
already allows for the identification of rich heterogeneity governing individual expectations
about health shocks. However, although there is evidence that consumers do not fully know
the price of health care before selecting services (Lieber, 2017), this is less concerning with
chronic care costs, which are typically stable over time and hence more easily predicted by
household members. The empirical distributions are similarly assumed to be stable across
years, but I use a separate distribution in the year of diagnosis to accommodate potentially
higher costs in that year (e.g., for unexpected hospitalizations).
Finally, I allow family risk aversion ψft to evolve over time as discussed above. In














where mCHf0 represents the billed spending associated with the diagnostic event, cj(m
CH
f0 )
the OOP spending of the diagnostic event, and Hospf0 indicates whether a hospitalization
occurred as part of the diagnosis. I assume that ζft ∼ N (0, σ2ψ).
I denote the parameters of the model by θ. These parameters include the main parameters
of interest ~π and ~ψ, including the variances σ2π and σ
2
ψ. Additional parameters included in
the estimation are the utility parameters α1, α2, ω, and η; the five vectors of mean shifters
(βp, βψ, βλ, βσλ , βκ); seven variance and covariance parameters (σp, σµ, σψ, σκ, σp,ψ, σp,µ, σψ,µ);
and the variance of the idiosyncratic shock term σ2ε , which scales the choice probabilities. I
assume that these idiosyncratic shocks follow the typical Type-1 Extreme Value distribution.
Based on θ and the data, I am able simulate values for pift, µλif , σλif , λift, and ψft.
I estimate the model via maximum likelihood with the appropriate adaptation for mod-
eling a discrete choice followed by a continuous one (Dubin and McFadden, 1984; Revelt
and Train, 1998; Train, 2009). For a given household, likelihood functions are constructed
as the density of their observed health spending conditional on their observed plan choices.
I provide additional estimation details in Appendix D.
4.3.2 Identification & Interpretation
My model utilizes multiple sources of variation to separate multiple effects arising from major
medical events. In addition to any changes in individual risk beliefs, health events may alter
health behaviors by changing the price of non-chronic care, increasing the salience of health
consumption, providing experiential learning about how to obtain high-quality health care,
or altering preferences for medical care in other ways. The critical challenge is that changes
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in risk preferences, salience, or systematic health learning may also increase the willingness
to purchase insurance and utilize medical care.
I use a rich set of major health events that vary in their expected costs, both in the year
of diagnosis and in following years. This variation in the expected costs needed to maintain
health for someone with a chronic condition changes the extent to which a specific chronic
condition significantly alters the expected prices for other, non-chronic medical care. This
variation, coupled with variation in plan spending characteristics, allows me to separate
moral hazard effects from other drivers of behavior.
To separate risk aversion from beliefs, I use variation in insurance plan characteristics and
choice sets faced by different households in my data set. These choice sets vary at the firm-
state-year level, and typically include plans with a wide range of cost-sharing parameters
(Table 2). Under the assumption that risk aversion drives plan choice and not medical
spending, and that households with high risk aversion seek to reduce the incidence of high
OOP expenditures, highly risk-averse households will gravitate towards the plans in their
choice sets that most limit high expenses (e.g., low-deductible plans). Finally, I use data
on the circumstances of major medical events—including the resulting costs and whether a
hospitalization occurred—to incorporate the role of salience associated with health trauma
in changing household risk aversion.
The principal estimated structural parameters of interest in my model are those governing
the evolution of the transition probabilities pift. Changes in these parameters that arise
from new chronic diagnoses encompass both a reevaluation of individual health risk beliefs
and other informational effects unaccounted for in the model, which may load onto this
parameter. These effects include learning about the health care system more generally or
forging better relationships with health care providers. Although section 3 suggests that
these factors are not the principal mechanisms for responses, they may influence how pift
responds to new diagnoses. I therefore interpret changes in pift as resulting from an aggregate
informational effect, rather than from moral hazard or salience effects.29
5 Structural Results
Table 5 presents the estimated parameters resulting from maximum likelihood estimation.
Column 3 shows the preferred specification described in Section 4, while columns 1 and 2
present simplifications of the model that are useful both in building intuition and validating
the estimated parameters. Additional parameters not relevant to the welfare effects of health
29Appendix C discusses an alternative interpretation of pift as a preference weighting across states rather
than explicitly health beliefs.
33
information—including incidental parameters such as switching costs and individual mean-
shifting regression coefficients—can be found in Appendix Table D.1.
I consistently find strong effects on non-diagnosed beliefs associated with household
chronic diagnoses. New chronic diagnoses are associated with an average increase in an
individual’s belief of a major health event of 33 percentage points, an effect which is far
larger than those estimated for acute events for either the individual or their family mem-
bers, which are estimated to only increase risk beliefs by five and six percentage points,
respectively. These increases are persistent, with little evidence that risk beliefs decrease
over time (the estimated time trend coefficient is only one percentage point each year). The
estimated variance for the unobserved dimension of belief changes is low, indicating that
unobserved events are not contributing to large changes in risk assessments.
Table 5 also presents parameters illustrating how the effects of new chronic illnesses alter
behaviors in other meaningful ways. Major health events—both acute and chronic—are
associated with strong salience effects that increase household risk aversion. On average,
experiencing a major health event increases the coefficient of household risk aversion by
0.61, a 34.9% increase over the pre-diagnosis average coefficient of 1.75.30 These effects are
stronger when the household event entails either a higher amount of total billed spending or
a hospitalization, suggesting that households respond differently to the intensity of an event.
Panel B reports additional information regarding the distribution of household types and
the value of incorporating the full richness of the model in rationalizing observed plan choices
and spending. In particular, I estimate a high degree of variance in individual health risk
beliefs (prior to any health event). These beliefs are weakly positively correlated with acute
health status and negatively correlated with household risk aversion. These facts suggest
that variation in individuals’ estimated beliefs reflects variation in individual health status,
as expected. Finally, in the full version of the model, the variance of the idiosyncratic error
term is small, suggesting that most of the observed variation in consumer behavior can be
explained by heterogeneity in individual types, responses to major health events, or both.
Models 1 and 2 of Table 5 illustrate simplifications of the model that help validate the
estimated parameters and build intuition. In Model 1, I estimate a version of the model
with no heterogeneity in acute health shocks or changes in household risk aversion. That
30To put these numbers into context, I follow the results of Cohen and Einav (2007) and consider the
amount $X that would make the average household in my sample indifferent between a sure payoff of $0 and
an equal-odds gamble between winning $100 and losing $X. Prior to a diagnosis, the average value of $X is
roughly $85.08; after diagnosis, this value changes to $80.85. These results are comparable with previous
estimates of household risk aversion for health insurance (Einav et al., 2013; Marone and Sabety, 2021)—
however, as mentioned in Einav et al. (2013), the coefficients from models incorporating both health and
financial risk do not compare to those of models with pure financial risk (Cohen and Einav, 2007; Handel,
2013).
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Table 5. Estimated Structural Parameters of Interest
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err. Estimate Std. Err.
Panel A: Dynamic Parameters
Belief Evolution
π1 Family Chronic Event 0.69 (0.002) 0.17 (0.002) 0.33 (0.002)
π2 Own Acute Event 0.07 (0.002) 0.02 (0.001) 0.05 (0.002)
π3 Family Acute Event 0.09 (0.002) 0.03 (0.001) 0.06 (0.002)
π4 Years since Event -0.01 (0.000) 0.002 (0.000) 0.01 (0.000)
σπ Error Variance 10.29 (0.000) 0.12 (0.005) 1.52 (0.018)
Risk Aversion Evolution
ψ0 Persistence, Year t− 1 – – – – 0.95 (0.025)
ψ1 Health Event (HE) – – – – 0.61 (0.015)
ψ2 HE × Year 0 Cost – – – – 0.19 (0.020)
ψ3 HE × Year 0 OOP – – – – -0.88 (0.024)
ψ4 HE × Hospitalization – – – – 1.51 (0.033)
σψ Error Variance – – – – 0.01 (0.016)
Panel B: Heterogeneity in Types
σ2ε Idiosyncratic Shock 5.92 (1.006) 6.24 (0.109) 3.56 (0.085)
σ2p Initial Beliefs 16.59 (0.410) 24.43 (0.003) 14.51 (0.001)
σ2ψ Initial Risk Aversion 15.22 (0.289) 5.55 (0.005) 2.57 (0.005)
σ2λ Acute Shocks – – 0.58 (0.004) 2.03 (0.001)
ρp,ψ -0.87 (0.360) -0.43 (0.002) -0.54 (0.002)
ρp,λ – – -0.91 (0.006) 0.38 (0.002)
ρψ,λ – – 0.12 (0.002) 0.09 (0.002)
Beliefs Evolve Yes Yes Yes
Acute Shock Heterogeneity Yes Yes
Risk Aversion Evolves Yes
Notes: This table presents estimates for selected parameters of the structural model of health choice;
Appendix Table D.1 presents estimates for the remaining parameters. Belief evolution parameters ~π are
reported as marginal effects. Standard errors are derived from the analytical Hessian of the likelihood
function. Column 3 presents my primary estimates used in later calculations. All models are estimated on
an unbalanced panel of 179,044 households over eight years. Preference coefficients are relative to thousands
of dollars.
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is, µλ,i, σλ,i, and κλ,i are not allowed to vary based on individual covariates, and ψft is fixed
over time. A key difference between Model 1 and my preferred specification is that the
estimated impact of chronic health shocks on risk belief distributions is much higher when
I do not accommodate heterogeneity either in period-level health shocks or salience effects.
This result is intuitive, as the absence of this heterogeneity leads to the inaccurate “loading”
of belief changes onto specific events.31 This loading is observed on a comparable scale
for coefficients for acute major health events as well; however, note that these effects are
associated with higher overall variance in belief evolution, presumably because the simplified
model attempts to explain multiple sources of variation through a single channel.
Column 2 adds variation in acute health status to the model while continuing to hold
household risk aversion constant over time. Accounting for this heterogeneity explains a
substantial portion of the belief evolution pattern suggested by the most simplified model,
decreasing the size of the effect of all major health events by about two-thirds and the
variance of unobserved belief shocks (σπ) even more drastically. Similarly, including acute
health shocks in each period reduces the estimated variation in initial coefficients of risk
aversion and the correlation between risk aversion and beliefs, suggesting that including
that accounting for variation across health states is important in estimating both health
learning and salience effects. A key difference between column 2 and column 3 is that
after incorporating the explicit modeling of salience effects, the estimated effect of major
health events on belief changes is almost double. Notice that there is a strong negative
correlation between household beliefs and risk aversion; this means that when estimated
together, salience effects may have muted the estimated effect of belief changes. Hence, it
is to be expected that separating salience effects from belief changes increases the estimated
effect of events on beliefs.
5.1 Model Fit
I evaluate the fit of my estimated model at both the plan choice and spending stages. To
evaluate plan choices, I compare plan choices for households observed in the data with
those predicted by the model in Figure 6. Predicted choice probabilities are influenced by
premiums, inertia, and household expectations of their acute and chronic health shocks,
valued based on their level of risk aversion. At the level of household spending, I compare
observed household spending distributions to those predicted by the model. As spending
decisions are made after the realization of two random variables (acute and chronic health
31This is exacerbated by the fact that acute health states and chronic diagnoses are correlated, as presented
in Panel B of Table 5.
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shocks), I base the model predictions off of a single draw of these underlying variables. I
pool all individuals within a firm across years.
Figure 6. Predicted and Observed Insurance Plan and Health Care Spending Choices




















Notes: Figures show overall match between estimated model predictions and observed household
choices, at both the plan choice (left) and spending (right) stages of the model. In the first panel,
market shares for each insurance plan offered to employees of the single largest firm are shown (see
Appendix D for other firms). All years are pooled, so each observation is a household-year. The over-
all match rate is 82.2%. The second panel plots distributions of predicted and observed household
health care spending, conditional on predicted/observed spending greater than zero (the observed rate
of zero spending is 16.6% and the predicted rate is 13.2%). All years are pooled, so an observation is
a household-year. Vertical lines represent the mean of the respective distribution.
Figure 6 presents the results. The first panel shows the observed and predicted market
shares for enrollment in plans offered in the largest firm in my sample. Overall, predicted
shares are closely matched. The panel on the right presents observed and estimated spend-
ing conditional on a plan choice. Here, the model predicts slightly higher levels of billed
spending than are typically observed, with a difference of about $1,000 between the means
of the two distributions. The model appropriately predicts the extensive margin of spending,
appropriately capturing the fraction of individuals who choose zero medical spending in a
given year.
5.2 Spending Response to Major Health Events
Figure 7 illustrates the model’s predictions surrounding behavior following new chronic di-
agnoses in a household as recentered time series graphs. Similar to the results in Section
3, I examine how these diagnoses alter the spending patterns of other household members
in the panel (a). I also present estimates for how diagnoses affect estimates for individuals’
underlying transition probabilities pit in panel (b). In my model, household diagnoses are
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associated large increases in OOP spending (about 20%, a difference which is statistically
indistinguishable from the 10% reported earlier).
Figure 7. Model Predictions: Non-Diagnosed Spending and Beliefs Around a New Diagnosis
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Notes: Figures show recentered time series for model predictions of spending and beliefs for non-
diagnosed household members who have experienced a diagnosis with a new chronic illness in the
household. The first panel illustrates percentage changes in the inverse hyperbolic sine of OOP spend-
ing, measured in 2020 USD. The second panel illustrates estimated changes in predicted beliefs, averaged
over draws from individual posterior distributions. The green horizontal line in Panel (b) illustrates
the average in-sample rate of diagnosis with a new chronic condition, roughly 2.5%.
Importantly, I predict large accompanying changes in individual health risk beliefs fol-
lowing a new chronic diagnosis in the family. The horizontal green line in the Panel (b) of
Figure 7 depicts the pooled average risk of diagnosis within my sample, which is roughly
2.5%. Prior to health events, individuals tend to underweight their health risks by about
58%; however, following a diagnosis, individuals move to over-weighting their risks by over
six times the true in-sample rates of diagnosis. Instead, these households make choices as
though they perceived their risk of a chronic diagnosis to be greater than one in ten. This
provides suggestive evidence that individuals in affected households may over-respond to
these events. I explore the welfare implications of these facts in the following section.
6 Welfare & Counterfactual Simulations
Based on the estimated model parameters, I am able to construct a measure of each house-
hold’s willingness to pay for information associated with their own health risks. I use this
measure to provide a benchmark for the value associated with this information, with par-
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ticular focus on whether major health events meaningfully alter individual expected utility
and social surplus.
6.1 Welfare Effects of Information
Households who receive health information alter their plan choice and medical spending de-
cisions, thereby altering their ex-ante expected payoffs from care. My model allows me to
estimate the spillover value of new health information for non-diagnosed household mem-
bers by comparing these expected payoffs in the observed data—where household members
use information to alter choices—and a counterfactual regime where the information is not
revealed. In this counterfactual state, non-diagnosed household members experience the ob-
served sequence of acute health shocks without any of the changes to pift, ψft, or cj(·) that
would arise from a chronic event in the household.32
A household’s willingness to pay for health information is equal to the difference in
certainty equivalents across these two regimes. Certainty equivalents are given by
CEfjt = −ψ−1ft log(−Ufjt), (16)
where Ufjt is the total ex-ante expected utility family f expects when enrolling in plan j
at time t, as defined in equation 9. I assume that conditional on the estimated parameters,
households are fully rational and enroll in the plan that gives the highest expected utility at
the time of choice.33 Throughout, I report differences between CEfjt across the benchmark
state of the world and regimes where information is partially or fully revealed; hence, reported
values are “marginal” willingness to pay measures.
The utility-maximizing decision in my model is one where agents choose an appropriate
level of spending relative to an uncertain multi-dimensional health shock; new health risk
information changes the relative weight agents place on the dimensions of that shock when
making their decisions. Hence, this welfare criterion measures how much households would
be willing to pay for the information, based on their resulting changes in utilization choices
during that period. My model does not allow me to measure the welfare effects of infor-
mation in terms of long-term health production, for example from an increased investment
in preventive health services. Such welfare effects are interesting particularly in conjunction
32I limit attention to non-diagnosed household members in order to estimate the spillover value of new
health information, as well as to ignore the mechanical changes in household expected welfare that arise
when a household member’s health state is permanently altered, as with a new chronic diagnosis.
33The model allows for rich heterogeneity in the prediction of health states as well as rationalizations for
common choice mistakes, including switching costs. Hence, such an assumption is reasonable. Similarly, I
assume that the idiosyncratic shock parameter is not relevant for the context of estimating welfare gains
from health information.
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with feasible health policies that jointly reveal information about health risk and the relative
quality of health services. However, these returns would take more years to be realized than
my sample permits me to analyze.
Figure 8. Variation in Welfare Effects Associated with Health Events and Health Information
(a) Full Welfare Effect
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Notes: Figures show estimated changes in household willingness to pay associated with major health
events. The panel on the left shows differences in household certainty equivalents in the case of a full
response to a new diagnosis, including adjustments to risk aversion and moral hazard effects; the panel
on the right shows only differences arising from adjustments to household risk assessments. Welfare
effects are calculated in the year of the diagnosis relative to a benchmark in which no information is
transmitted.
Figure 8 depicts variation in household willingness to pay for health information in the
year of the new chronic diagnosis.34 Household members who are exposed to a new chronic
diagnosis experience a welfare penalty that averages $3,076 per household per year. However,
there is substantial heterogeneity in these effects, including 28% of treated families who have
a higher resulting expected utility following the realization of health information.
The right panel of Figure 8 shows the distribution of welfare effects associated solely with
receiving new health information. A novel feature of my structural model is the ability to
separate changes to household welfare that arise from dimensions of a health event other
than the realization of health information. I recalculate welfare changes associated with only
changes to household beliefs by holding constant changes to both household risk aversion
and any moral hazard effects that arise from changes to spot prices. My analysis reveals that
these dimensions contribute little to overall changes in household welfare, with 90% of welfare
changes being explicitly attributable to changes in household beliefs. The average household
experiences a welfare penalty of $2,788 associated with changes to how they evaluate their
34These welfare effects are stable in the first few years following the diagnosis; hence, for ease of interpre-
tation, I only focus on the year of diagnosis itself.
40
risk of developing a chronic condition. This corresponds to an average decrease in welfare of
about 11.6% (Appendix Figure D.1).
Although at first glance associating new information with a welfare penalty seems counter-
intuitive, my results are consistent with a story of household over-responsiveness to infor-
mation. The observed choice data which informed the estimated model parameters suggests
that new chronic diagnosis spur large swings in household members’ assessments of their
health risks; however, these welfare calculations make clear that in many cases, households
would be better off if they had acted as though they had not received the information. This
is precisely because of the magnitude of the shifts in household beliefs, as I illustrate in the
following section.
Importantly, the returns to health information vary with key household characteristics,
including household risk levels and estimated risk aversion (Appendix Figure D.2). House-
holds who are less averse to negative outcomes prior to the diagnosis experience lower welfare
penalties, on average, than those with higher risk aversion. Differences in this parameter
are intuitively meaningful: households with greater risk aversion experience greater “trans-
lation” of new health information into changes in insurance plan choices and, subsequently,
health spending. Hence, households with lower levels of risk aversion tend to respond less
to new information, presumably contributing to the lower estimated welfare penalties asso-
ciated with the event. Similarly, households with high expected health risks prior to a new
diagnosis experience lower welfare penalties. This, too, is related to overall muted responses
to health information. However, this low level of responsiveness is attributable not to low
variation in expected utility but to an already high level of expected spending, meaning new
health events change outcomes (in percentage terms) less.
6.2 Evaluating Household Over-Responsiveness to Information
The results above imply that while households respond meaningfully to new health informa-
tion, they may not be doing so in ways that are welfare improving. Given these estimated
welfare penalties, in this section I assess the extent to which consumers’ over-responsiveness
to health information dampens potential welfare gains. The model predicts large swings in
consumer beliefs when exposed to chronic diagnoses in a household. I therefore first assess
the extent to which limiting the magnitude of these changes affects estimated welfare differ-
ences. I then turn to practical policy questions surrounding when information revelation is
optimal, and whether targeted revelation can improve social outcomes.
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6.2.1 Bounding Belief Updating
I first consider how limiting household responsiveness to adverse health events alters esti-
mated welfare gains or penalties from new health risk information. Here, I present esti-
mated effects from imposing arbitrary upper bounds on an individual’s beliefs about their
own health risks; that is, imposing that any predicted value pift in the model be no greater
than some threshold p. This exercise illustrates that if consumers’ responses more closely
matched their true expected risk (conditional on the household member’s diagnosis), health
information would be associated with welfare gains rather than losses.








0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5
Belief Upper Bound
Average WTP Median WTP
Notes: Figure depicts estimated household willingness to pay for new health information across multiple
counterfactual scenarios in which post-event health beliefs are capped at p. Each point represents a
distinct scenario with p indicated along the x-axis. Average and median household WTP for new
information are depicted as the maroon scatter plot (with 95% confidence intervals) and the smoothed
blue-gray line, respectively. The vertical dashed green line represents the in-sample rate of diagnosis
(about 2.5%), while the long-dashed maroon line represents the upper bound at which welfare is
maximized (about 10%).
Figure 9 presents the results. The figure summarizes household WTP for information
across multiple scenarios, each with a varying degree of restrictiveness on p. Average and
median welfare gains are plotted; notice that the distribution of welfare gains is skewed as
suggested in Figure 8. As opposed to a scenario with no restrictions—where the median
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household’s informational WTP was -$141—the median household would be willing to pay
a positive amount for information whenever p is less than 45%. Welfare gains continue to
improve as this bound becomes more restrictive until p is about 11% (shown in the Figure
as the marroon long-dashed line). At this point, the average (median) household’s welfare is
estimated to be $2,027 ($711); in addition, about 86% of households receive welfare benefits
from information, compared to 0.2% in the baseline scenario.
As the upper bound moves past this point, average household welfare gains begin to
diminish. The belief upper bound which achieves an average WTP maximum is larger than
the true in-sample risk of diagnosis (shown in the Figure as the green dashed line); this is
because declines in consumer welfare following this point represent heterogeneous returns
to new health information. Although the generic household in the model prefers, ceteris
paribus, to have beliefs matching their true risk of chronic diagnosis onset (due to the state-
dependence of preferences for non-chronic care), these risks vary across households. For
some, these risks skew much higher than the average rate of illness onset, meaning that
arbitrary bounds such as p risk harming households for whom information does, in fact,
reveal large changes to beliefs.
To examine this further, I estimate individual-specific health risks p̂ based on demograph-
ics including age, sex, and relationship with diagnosed household members. Although these
predicted health risk probabilities do not capture the full range of private information, they
address individual differences in potential responsiveness to new information. I estimate
predicted health risk probabilities on a validation sample constructed from all Marketscan
households not in my main sample who experience at least one chronic event during their
observed period. Additional details about this estimation and summary statistics for the
resulting probabilities are provided in Appendix D. The predicted probabilities are small
and match in-sample diagnostic risks.
When I impose these predicted probabilities as individual-specific upper bounds, I find
that the average household would be willing to pay $2,385 for information, an 18% increase
in average returns over the welfare-maximizing point in Figure 9. This underscores that
exploiting individual risk characteristics to further refine household responsiveness can in-
crease welfare. Importantly, accommodating for these heterogeneous returns to information
explains the average differences between the welfare-maximizing upper-bound p predicted by
the model and the in-sample rate of diagnosis demonstrated by the data. I explore methods
to harness these heterogeneous returns to maximize social welfare of information-revealing
social policies in the following section.
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6.2.2 Targeting Information to Maximize Gains
In addition to concerns about individual over-responsiveness to health information, policy
guiding the revelation of health information must also balance the potentially heterogeneous
returns from such revelation. In the face of such variation, full information revelation may
not be socially optimal. This includes cases where a full screening regime is not financially
feasible, where the information itself may result in consumers declining actuarily fair insur-
ance (Posey and Thistle, 2021), or where there is a disconnect between privately and socially
optimal information revelation (Oster et al., 2013). In these cases, the ability to target poli-
cies that reveal health risk information may improve the social returns as well as the fraction
of households who benefit from these programs.
I estimated strong heterogeneous returns to health information (Appendix Figure D.2).
Based on these results, I consider the effects of targeting information revelation based on
observable characteristics, such as individual risk scores.35 I consider a scenario in which
individuals can receive a one-time update to information about their health risks, modeled
as changes to their probability of adverse health events pift. When individuals receive this
information, this probability is adjusted to be equivalent to their predicted risk probability
p̂ift defined above. I assume that following this information, individual beliefs are constant
at their predicted risk level, with no residual uncertainty or updating across periods.36 As
before, I assume away salience and moral hazard effects.
This scenario therefore mirrors a hypothetical transmission of health information that
informs consumers of their health risks as perfectly as population-data allows.37 I present
results of the individual and social value of this revelation based on 50,000 households in
my sample which do not experience major health events. These individuals may still have
erroneous beliefs about their health risks and may benefit from new health information. Fur-
thermore, the estimated welfare effects of this policy validates the results presented earlier,
documenting the value of information transmitted in a more quasi-random setting.
Figure 10 presents the results, showing both average welfare gains and the fraction of
targeted households benefitting from the information. Each point represents a scenario in
which only individuals with risk scores falling in the top x% of the sample receive health
information. The average household in the full sample would be willing to pay approxi-
35Appendix Figure D.2 illustrates that other, less-easily observable characteristics (e.g., household risk
aversion) may also be beneficial.
36I ignore residual uncertainty that would arise from individuals treating information revelation as a single
signal, rather than true information. For the purposes of this exercise, such fluctuations would serve only to
obfuscate the potential benefits of targeting information revelation relative to universal revelation.
37Note that p̂ift is not equivalent to one’s true risk as private information (e.g., underlying health status)
is not incorporated.
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Figure 10. Changes in Welfare Gains From Targeted Revelation of Information
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Notes: Figures show estimated welfare gains from revelation of health information. Individuals are
organized by their average risk scores, from highest to lowest. Each point in both panels represents a
different counterfactual scenario, where individuals with risk scores in the top x% of the sample are
given information about their predicted health risks, p̂, as described in the text. Returns to health
information are presented as (a) average expected welfare changes, measured as willingness to pay in
2020 USD, and (b) the percentage of households with non-negative welfare gains.
mately $2,500 per year for updated health information (the right-most point in Panel (a));
this information benefits roughly 85% of households (the right-most point in Panel (b)).38
In contrast, revealing information only to higher-risk individuals improves welfare gains: re-
vealing information only to individuals within the top quartile of the risk score distribution
increases average welfare gains to over $5,000 per household per year, benefiting more than
95% of households.
Hence, even policies that are capable of revealing information that closely matches
individuals’ true risks without inducing salience responses, moral hazard effects, or over-
responsiveness may still benefit from using demographic information to identify households
that are most likely to benefit from the policy. For example, policies such as universal
genetic screening programs—such as common programs in the U.S. providing risk informa-
tion to newborns in many developed countries—may incur private welfare costs to specific
households, even as they improve societal welfare more generally.
38Not every household in the sample benefits from information about predicted risk. There are two
reasons why even such high-quality information may make a household worse off. First, the household may
have private information regarding their true risks, making public information counter-productive. Second,
highly risk averse households may benefit from placing smaller weights on the adverse state of the world than
are objectively accurate; this is similar to an “optimal expectations” model where individuals do not benefit
from information when it lowers utility in an anticipation period (Oster et al., 2013). Overall, this highlights
a central tension inherent in the dissemination of health information: even high-quality information can
incur individual welfare costs based on how households value health care across states.
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7 Conclusion
This paper assesses the extent to which information about one’s health risks alters individual
and household decision-making in health care. I demonstrate that households who receive
new information about health risks from a new diagnosis in the household increase their
overall levels of spending, including investments in both preventive and low-value services.
These changes in behavior are best explained by individual household members reassessing
their risks, rather than responding to financial incentives or salience effects. However, these
reassessments do not meaningfully improve the quality of their health care choices. While
access to new health information changes behavior in meaningful ways, it does not necessarily
do so in welfare-improving ones.
To explore this further, I use a structural approach to quantify a household’s willingness
to pay for health information, isolating the specific effects of new health information from
other mechanisms. The model implies low realized returns to health information, most
likely due to individual misinterpretation of their health risks following the health event.
Bounding the extent to which individuals increase their beliefs about risks post-diagnosis
substantially improves realized welfare. Finally, my analysis illustrates that information
revelation is privately most optimal for individuals with high ex-ante risk and those with
low risk aversion.
The analysis I present could be extended in several meaningful ways. First, future work
could relax the assumption that individuals have no control over their chronic care health
costs. This would be particularly interesting in non-ESI covered populations, such as those
covered by public insurance programs or without any coverage, for whom chronic diagnoses
may impose large financial burdens (Hadley, 2007). Another important consideration left
out of the model is how liquidity constraints change ex-post spending adjustments as health
risks change (Gross et al., 2020). Finally, future work might integrate this model with other
costs incurred through living with a chronic condition, including earnings penalties and job
lock (Biasi et al., 2019; Eriksen et al., 2021; Garthwaite et al., 2014).
Increasing an understanding of how consumers interpret new information is at least as
vital as improving their access. Family health experiences are powerful forces in shaping in-
dividual behaviors and decisions; however, witnessing these experiences may lead individuals
to “over-react” when making future consumption decisions. Individuals and families living
with the risk of chronic illness may be better off as they are taught to seek out high-value
medical care and temper high expectations of negative outcomes.
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